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Although the data are quite limited, there is some suggestion that whereas unions are
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somewhat poorer productivity performance.  However, this research throws up as
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workplaces to investigate both this and other aspects of Spanish industrial relations.
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1.  Introduction
Trade unions in Spain are something of a curious phenomenon.  Having
survived Franco as covert organisations, they enjoyed a huge surge in membership
in the late 1970s with the advent of democratic government.  Their membership fall
in the 1980s, however, was equally precipitous despite the presence of a socialist
government in power and new rights to representation and to strike afforded to
employees.  Therefore on the basis of membership changes alone, they seem to be
forlorn organisations.  On the other hand, over 80% of Spanish employees have their
terms and conditions of employment determined through collective negotiations.1
Worker representatives involved in the latter are predominantly associated with a
trade union.  Therefore on the basis of collective bargaining coverage, Spain's unions
are significant players in the industrial relations field.  This low membership, high
coverage nexus is not unique to Spain, France has a similar combination, but there
is rather a lot to be explained here if we are to understand the role Spanish unions
play in industrial relations institutions, processes and outcomes.
This paper has three main aims:  to describe the main features of Spanish
unionism in terms of strength, organisation, interactions and finances; to investigate
explanations for certain important features - in particular to examine the role of the
state, especially through its labour legislation - and; to analyse the impact of unions
on performance outcomes - ie to answer the question "what do unions do"?  Perhaps
unsurprisingly, whilst in some areas there is a glut of information on union activities
(notably on the worker representation system) in others there are some important
gaps in knowledge (union membership numbers and composition are sketchy and
fairly unreliable).  Therefore some analytical points are built on rather unstable
foundations which need underpinning through more representative, validated
sources.
Part I fulfils the first two of our aims in four sections analysing respectively:
alternative measures of union strength and explanations for their current and
previous states; 
internal union organisation; union finances; and inter-union relations.  In Part II the
impact of unions on pay/employment flexibility, trends in pay dispersion and
productivity growth are evaluated using industry level data.
Part I
2.  A Brief History of Trade Unionism in Spain
Unionism developed in Spain during the last decades of the nineteenth century
and the first of the twentieth.  One of the current main unions, Unión General de
Trabajadores (UGT), was founded in 1888 and was closely linked to the socialist party
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).  As with the rest of Europe socialist politics
were gaining support amongst workers around this time - especially those
concentrated in the urban manufacturing centres.  There was also significant support
in Spain for a more revolutionary ideology, represented by the anarchist union
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT).  The latter union still exists today, but unlike
2other unions it has never recovered the glories of its pre-Franco heyday.  The
separate union for the Basque Country - Sindicato de Trabajadores Vascos (ELA-STV) -
also originated before the Civil War.
As in many other aspects of political and economic life, the Civil War (1936-
1939) and the Francoist period marked a deep break in Spanish union history.  Trade
unions were outlawed, their assets seized by the state, and a new system of industrial
relations was established. Employers and workers were obliged to join a single
official union, which supposedly represented their interests, but in fact was strongly
controlled by the state.  Only after changes to the system during the 1960s were
workers allowed to choose representatives directly who formed works councils at
workplace level (Jurados de Empresa). Although the system was highly regulated,
Spain's other main union, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), owes its origins to the Franco
industrial relations environment because of association and cooperation between
those elected worker representatives.  Another union which has its roots in this
period is Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), with christian social democrat origins, which
enjoyed a degree of  support in the first years of transition to democracy in the late
1970s.
After the death of Franco, the first democratic governments laid the
foundations for the current industrial relations system.  Through their political
affiliations, the three main unions influenced the structure and content of labour
reform.  UGT was the union arm of PSOE, CCOO was linked to the communist party
Partido Comunista Español (PCE), and USO was considered to be close to the centre-
right party in power, Union del Centro Democrático (UCD).  The principal industrial
relations concern of the new government was over which system of worker
representation to adopt.  The decisions made at this time have had long run
implications for how unions are structured, how they organise and their relationships
with their officials and members. 
3.  Measuring and Analysing Union Strength in Spain
a.  Membership
i.  introduction:  Traditionally, union strength is measured simply by union density -
typically, the proportion of employees in employment who are union members
(occasionally as the proportion of the labour force who are union members).  The
rises and falls in this indicator are used as the barometer of the strength of labour
movements around the world, and is the most common comparator (eg Blanchflower
and Freeman, 1992; OECD, 1994).  Data inadequacies regarding union membership
are common, and in this Spain is no exception.  In fact, there is no recognised,
authoritative source of data on union membership in Spain.  Therefore, we draw
together the disparate data on trends in overall membership and compositional
differences in terms of industry, gender, occupation, employment contract and the
different unions.  In general, these data suggest a movement in the crisis with
perilously low membership, often concentrated in industries in decline and therefore
apparently of little importance in the economic schema.
ii. union density:  Almost every study on Spanish unions (see Lawlor and Rigby
1986, for a good English language description on the topic) comments on the
difficulties of trying to obtain reliable data on membership.  The density estimates are
3derived from unions' own publications, or from small-scale surveys, hence some
caution is warranted when analysing them.  However, there is a general agreement
that union membership rates are very low by European standards, at the moment
only between 10 and 15% of workers are union members.  Table 1 summarises the
available data on aggregate density back to 1978 and also provides some comparative
evidence from other OECD countries.
It is impossible to determine the level of genuine union membership in the
pre-democracy period because unions were officially banned.  However, there was
clearly an enormous increase in membership in the transition to democracy period
reaching a peak of over 35% in 1979, and over 50% in manufacturing.  Membership
started to fall at a precipitous rate - probably faster than it had risen - in the late
1970s, plummeting to under 15% by the mid-1980s.  Since then membership has
remained relatively low but apparently stable.
iii. differing fortunes of the major unions:  The data difficulties are most apparent
when attempting to estimate the relative density rates of the main unions.  Table 2
shows the estimates of union membership and density rates from individual level
surveys for the two main unions, CCOO and UGT, since 1979.  The final two
columns contain UGT's own estimate of membership and density for the same years
(CCOO has not been able to supply similar data).  The discrepancies can be
summarised as:  in the early 1980s UGT estimates are significantly below individual
survey estimates but more recently are slightly above.  Although we cannot be
certain, the explanation for the large discrepancy in the early 1980s may well lie in
different definitions of membership and the consequences of rapidly falling
membership.  UGT's own figures are members paying subscriptions, whereas the
survey definitions are probably rather looser.  In a period of rapidly falling
membership - ie the late 1970s, early 1980s - a large proportion of employees may
well still report themselves as members even though they no longer pay
subscriptions.  This may be particularly so if they joined the union in a state of
democratic euphoria, which was presumably the case for rather a lot of Spanish
workers.  Therefore the UGT figures are probably more accurate for the early 1980s.
The small remaining discrepancy in the figures is typical of the difference between
union and individual reported figures on union membership found elsewhere (in the
UK the discrepancy is around 2-3 percentage points for the early 1990s).
Bearing in mind the caveats about the data, we are forced to use the survey
data to compare the fortunes of different unions since we do not have union reported
figures from all the unions.  The two main unions, CCOO and UGT, together
comprise more than 70% of all union membership.  The changes in their respective
fortunes are detailed in Table 2.  In the late 1970s, CCOO had the edge over UGT
with around 17% of all employees, rising to nearly one third in manufacturing,
compared to less than 14% in UGT, with roughly the same in manufacturing.  More
than four-in-five union members were in either of the two large unions at their peak.
Currently, each union has only around 5% of employees in employment as members
according to the survey data, though UGT's own numbers report around 7%.
Therefore, in relative terms CCOO membership has collapsed slightly more than
UGT's, dropping more than 10 percentage points since 1978, compared to less than
8 for UGT.
4The remaining unions have very low levels of membership, and we have little
in the way of time series data.  ELA-STV is reported to have had around 85,000
members in 1993, or about 13% of employees in the Basque Country.   Therefore2
within its restricted sphere of operation, the union appears to be doing rather better
than the two main unions - though membership may be higher in the Basque
Country whatever the union because of the industrial mix there.  As for the other
unions, USO reported a membership of only 72,000 in 1992 and the public sector
union, Confederación Sindical Independiente de Funcionarios (CSIF), reported membership
of 110,000 in 1991 rising to 141,000 in 1993.  Unfortunately, there appears to be no
readily available data on the membership of the exclusively Galician union,
Converxencia Intersindical Galega (CIG).
iv. union composition:  Even in the UK, where there is a century-long time series on
aggregate union density, it is only comparatively recently that it has been possible to
accurately gauge the extent of union membership among different gender,
occupation, age, educational achievement groups or in different industrial sectors and
regions.  Therefore, given the paucity of aggregate information in Spain, it is
unsurprising that union composition data are relatively few and far between and are
subject to source-based bias.
Table 3 summarises UGT data on its density rates by sector in 1981 and 1992.
The higher density levels in manufacturing are typical but what is rather surprising
is the large increase in density in services over the period - up around 6 percentage
points according to UGT's own data.  Table 3 also shows the composition of union
membership by sector (the proportion of union members in each sector) for the two
main unions in 1981 and 1990.  Both unions have undergone some changes in
membership structure, presumably mirroring similar changes in the structure of
employment, with shifts from manufacturing towards services being the most
important development.  These data may also give some indication as to why the
relative fall in UGT membership was less than that for CCOO - because UGT has
been more successful at stemming the losses from manufacturing decline by
recruiting in the service sector.
A survey of employees in 1988 revealed that the majority of union members
are skilled middle-aged males, with manufacturing jobs and hired through permanent
contracts in large or medium size firms (Instituto IDES 1989).  In small unions there
is a higher proportion of women, white-collar and administrative workers than in
UGT and CCOO, and their political beliefs are more conservative than those of
members of the main unions.  The main reasons expressed by non-members for not
joining a union in a UGT survey were:  no sympathy for any union (18.2%),
"politicization" of unions (12.4%), lack of credibility or honesty (10.9%) and lack of
real representativity (8.7%).
Information from the public sector shows that the membership rate is higher
in this sector at around 27% (UGT, 1992).  There is a higher presence of women
members (comprising 40% of all members) which probably reflects the fact that there
are relatively more women in the public than in the private sector.  Membership rates
are higher in the lower categories of workers, and rates decrease when the level of
education is higher.  Those workers with a university degree show the lowest
inclination to join unions.
5v. why such low membership?:  In the UK and US, the level of union membership
is largely determined by the interplay of two relationships, that between employer
and union(s) - whether or not unions are recognised for collective bargaining - and
that between employee and union - whether or not an individual chooses to belong
to a union, usually one recognised for bargaining their terms and conditions of
employment.  This statement is justified on the grounds that holding all else equal
union density is significantly higher in workplaces or firms or industries where
unions are recognised for collective bargaining.  Therefore increases and declines in
union membership can be analysed in terms of two stages, changes in the tendency
of employers to recognise unions and changes in the disposition of individual
employees to join recognised unions.  In general, five factors are said to influence
these interactions:  the composition of jobs, workers and firms; macroeconomic
variables; state policies; employer actions; and union activities.
In Spain's case the question of what determines the incidence of union
recognition is moribund, since recognition is effectively mandatory should the
workers demand it (of course, we could still be interested in what determines
workers' proclivity towards demanding worker representative elections).  Therefore
the analysis of why union membership is so low in Spain, and why it declined so
rapidly at the end of the 1970s/early 1980s, must focus on individual's preferences
vis a vis union membership.  We can still consider the five potential determinants
listed above, but concentrate on their impact on individual preferences.
Given the UGT data on the typical union member - male, skilled, middle aged,
permanent contract, manufacturing job, working in a medium-sized or large firm -
the changing composition of employment story seems, a priori, a highly plausible
explanation for low membership.  All the compositional changes in the Spanish
labour force since the early 1980s have been away from these areas with increasing
proportions of women, younger, fixed-term contract employees and jobs in the
service sector and in small firms (Segura et al 1991).  Given that these groups appear
to have a lower propensity to unionize, the composition story reads rather well.
However, as with composition stories elsewhere in the world, there are some
significant problems.  These can be summarised as timing and lack of analytical
depth.  Some of the labour force changes, most notably the enormous increase in the
incidence of fixed-term contracts, occurred well after (ie from the mid-1980s) the
dramatic fall in membership indicating a timing problem.  On the analytical level, this
explanation accepts at face value that some groups have lower unionisation rates than
others, without offering an adequate assessment of why such groups have lower
propensities to unionise.  Finally, the history of union movements worldwide show
enormous variation in the tendencies of different labour force groups to unionise over
time - propensities to unionise are not set in stone.
The business cycle explanation focuses on the role of unemployment, real
wages and inflation changes which collectively influence individuals' predilection
towards union membership.  Although there have been variations in such a model,
the general prediction is that high and rising unemployment leads to falling
membership, relatively high real wage growth is associated with lower steady-state
membership and high relative inflation leads to higher membership.  The mechanisms
linking these variables to membership are multi-layered.  Rising unemployment has
both a direct effect as newly unemployed union members leave unions, and indirect
effects, such as employees anxious to avoid future unemployment leave unions in
6order to appease management or firms derecognise unions regarding their activities
as a threat to jobs.  Relative real wage growth effects can be summarised as a `threat'
effect.  When real wage growth is relatively high and unthreatened, employees
perceive no need for unions.  On the other hand, when growth is threatened
employees join unions in the anticipation of unions' ability to protect real wages.  The
circularity of this mechanism is rather worrying, however, in that the level of union
membership is also said to influence real wage growth, such that detecting causality
is always likely to be difficult.  There is a similar problem when analysing the impact
of changes in inflation on union membership in terms of this `threat effect'.  It seems
sensible to imagine that workers join unions when inflation is rising to protect
themselves, but it may just be that inflation rises because of cost-push factors due to
rising union membership!  The difficulties of defining sensible, non-endogenous,
mechanisms linking these determinants to union membership shifts, has lead the
main proponents of these explanations in Britain to concentrate solely on data
analysis rather than solving the mechanism conundrum (Carruth and Disney, 1988;
Disney, 1990).
A proper assessment of this explanation in Spain's case would require more
detailed union membership data.  Therefore these comments are somewhat tentative.
The unemployment story seems reasonably credible for Spain, but only until the late
1980s/early 1990s when, despite large falls in unemployment, membership remained
stubbornly low.  It would still be interesting to investigate whether or not the recent
large increases in unemployment to reach a quarter of the active labour force has
resulted in further falls in membership.  The real wages explanation hits difficulties
rather earlier than the unemployment story, in that real wage growth actually fell in
the late 1970s and remained relatively low until the late 1980s (Bentolila and Dolado,
1994) which sits uneasily with the union density data.  The correlation between
falling inflation and falling membership from the peak of both around the late 1970s
is consistent with the business cycle explanation apart from the fact that Spanish
inflation continued to decline from the mid-1980s whilst union density apparently
reached a floor at this time.  Therefore the correlation broke down.
State policies regarding unions have been cited by most commentators as an
important explanation for low union membership in Spain.  Unlike Britain, however,
where anti-union policies have been associated with falling density (Freeman and
Pelletier, 1990) in Spain's case the suggestion is that the state has "killed by kindness".
By providing a legal right to representation for all workers who want it, the state has
obviated the need for employees to join unions and seek recognition from employers
by weight of numbers to protect their interests.  It seems perfectly rational for an
individual to save the cost of union subscription, if being a union member makes no
difference to whether or not a union bargains over the individual's terms and
conditions.  This argument seems fairly convincing, and is probably appropriate for
France as well where employee representation enjoys similar legal protection.
However, the story is not completely straightforward.  Non-union respondents to the
UGT survey, discussed above, did not include "No need to join because covered
anyway" as a reason for non-membership - though perhaps people are reluctant to
be revealed in a callous, individualist light, especially to interviewers acting for a
trade union.
Although rarely mentioned by other authors, it is important to consider the
impact of legislation other than that concerning the worker representation system.
7Rights of association (the right to join a trade union) are protected under the
constitution for all workers except members of the armed forces and the police.
However, rights to dissociation are also protected (the right not to belong to a trade
union) so the closed shop - compulsory union membership - is illegal.  Although it
is impossible to quantify the exact effect of the closed shop on union membership,
most commentators would argue that it was an important determinant of rising
membership in Britain in the 1970s and its demise contributed to union membership
decline in the 1980s.  Therefore the illegality of the closed shop may partly explain
low membership in Spain. 
Two other aspects of the legislative framework may impact upon membership
- one positively and the other negatively.  On the plus side for aggregate union
membership was the extension of the worker representation system to most parts of
the public sector from 1987 (discussed below) which must have stimulated
membership in that workers' unions would now be recognised for collective
bargaining on their behalf.  On the negative side, may be the rights afforded to works
councils to perform functions which in other countries could only be fulfilled by a
trade union.  The most obvious example of this is the calling and organisation of
strikes, the right to do so which is restricted in many countries to trade unions
(Milner, 1995).
The actions and policies of employers seem the least plausible explanation for
the decline and low level of Spanish union density.  Apart from the significant black
economy, the size of which might in part be explained by pro-union legislation (but
is more likely to be explained by the desire to avoid other state instruments such as
employment taxes and safety rules), there is little evidence of Spanish employers
pursuing anti-union or union-busting strategies.  In large part this must be due to the
illegality of such policies - workers cannot vote away their right to collective
representation.  There is also little authoritative evidence to suggest that employers
have encouraged workers to commit themselves to the firm rather than a union,
through human resource management policies of employee involvement, performance
related pay or single status.
The final explanation concerns the role of unions' own activities - usually
concentrating on the resources expended on recruitment as opposed to collective
bargaining.  Although there is no evidence to definitively confirm this, it does seem
likely that Spanish unions are not spending significant resources on local recruitment
campaigns.  This is due to a number of factors:  general paucity of resources,
especially in terms of personnel at local level; conditioning by the collective
bargaining system to focus resources on fighting worker representative elections and
negotiating at industry level; and concentration of resources on servicing existing
members because of worries about retention.  It may also be that unions are
rationally choosing not to spend money on recruitment because they are correctly
assessing the cost-benefit ratio as unfavourable.  If relative union strength in an
industry is assessed on the basis of votes in worker representative elections, rather
than the respective levels of union membership, a rational, resource-constrained
union would devote those resources to election campaigns not membership drives.
The decline in union membership in Britain has been the subject of intense
debate among various commentators.  Some have sought to pin their colours to one
particular mast, whilst others have been content to argue that a multi determinant
explanation is more plausible and that it is very difficult to delineate exactly the
8contribution of each factor.  A modified version of the latter approach seems to be
an appropriate conclusion to draw on Spain.  Statistical analysis of the decline in
density is unlikely to be fruitful because of the difficulties in measuring the
dependent variable at aggregate, let alone industry or regional, level.  We have to be
content to argue that all five of the determinants detailed above may play some role,
but the most important explanation is probably the legislative framework which
obviates the need for Spanish workers to join unions to seek protection of living
standards and/or from arbitrary employer action.
vi. conclusions:  Spain's unions are among the weakest in the OECD, when measured
by union density, even bearing in mind the less than authoritative data sources.  The
domination of the two main unions, CCOO and UGT, remains unchallenged despite
huge falls in membership in the last fifteen years.  Explaining these falls and the low
level of membership involves deliberating between a number of plausible
determinants, none of which can be totally rejected or upheld.  It seems more likely
that a combination of these factors explains Spain's low membership, but the weight
attached to each determinant cannot be determined without more representative data
on union density across different groups and over time.  Finally, this picture of weak
unionism is undoubtedly overstated, since in fact unions in Spain actually enjoy huge
influence despite their low membership base.  An alternative measure of union
strength, union coverage, provides an almost diametrically opposite picture of union
fortunes since the late 1970s.
b.  Union coverage
i. a more appropriate measure of union strength:  Measuring union strength by
weight of membership numbers rests on the assumption that membership density
translates into procedural and substantive power.  Examples of procedural power
include membership of tripartite institutions, negotiating with employers at different
levels within an industry and being involved with other public institutions such as
training boards and adult education institutes.  Substantive power implies that unions
have some impact on the processes of and outcomes from work - manning levels,
production process, productivity, wages etc.  In fact, Spanish unions exercise power
to an extent wholly disproportionate to their membership levels - because of their
virtual monopoly of the pervasive worker representation system. An associated paper
provides evidence on the significant increase in the coverage of the worker
representative system from the late 1970s, and the continuing high level sustained
into the 1990s (Milner and Metcalf, 1994).  The disparity compared union density
changes and the striking difference between Spain and other OECD countries, apart
from France, is shown in Figure 1.
The degree of union involvement in this system is best calculated as a union
coverage measure - the proportion of workers covered by union negotiated collective
agreements.  This is certainly a good measure of procedural strength.  Whether or not
this also signifies high levels of substantive strength depends on the extent to which
unions are able to affect the terms and conditions of covered workers.  This can only
be gleaned by examining data on the impact of unions on economic outcomes - which
is attempted in Part II below.  
In an associated paper, the legislative framework determining the system of
worker representation is outlined (Metcalf, 1994).  The central institution of the
9modern Spanish workers' representation system are the workers' representative
elections, or improperly but usually called union elections.  These elections are held
each four years, during a three to six month period with dates varying across firms.
The elections play a dual role:  selecting representatives at workplace level to sit on
works councils; and secondly, to determine the relative presence of different unions
in sector level bargaining (in each region).  The proportion of representatives under
the auspices of each union determines that union's status nationally, regionally and
within individual industries.  This status affords certain significant rights to the
particular union.  Therefore worker representative election results are probably a
more appropriate measure of overall and relative union strength, than union density.
The number of representatives elected at each firm depends on the size of the
firm.  In firms with between 6 and 49 workers, representatives are called staff
delegates whereas in firms of 50 or more workers, representatives form a works
council.  Table 4 summarises the rules regarding number of representatives per firm,
and illustrates the implications for number of representatives per thousand workers
(which we term worker representative presence).  In general, smaller firms are likely
to have higher relative worker representative presence than medium and large ones.
This creates a certain distortion in the representation system, because observed
differences in worker representation can be caused by different firm size structures.
Beneyto (1991) also points out that this distortion affects the status of the "most
representative union", since that is calculated on the number of delegates obtained,
not on the actual number of votes.  Therefore, workers in small firms have a
relatively higher weight attached to their vote when choosing the most representative
union at other levels.
The most representative unions nationally are those which obtain a minimum
of 10% of all elected delegates in the country or 15% at regional level.  Only CCOO
and UGT have representative status at national level, giving them the right to sit on
all negotiating bodies throughout the country.  In addition, there are two regions
where local unions enjoy significant support and therefore are recognized as
representative unions in these areas - ELA-STV, which obtained 37.8% of delegates
in the Basque Country in 1990; and CIG, with 23.4% of Galician delegates in 1990.
The status of "most representative" gives unions certain representation rights:
they can participate in boards of public institutions on environmental, health and
education; they have rights to participate in collective bargaining at national and
sector level; their union sections at firm level have special rights on information and
participation in works councils; and they qualify for subsidies from the state.  What
is more important about the status of most representative union is that this moniker
applies not only to the main organization but also to every single union affiliated to
the organization. This implies that if union X is considered representative at national
level, its federation in a particular sector enjoys the rights of a most representative
union regardless of the actual support from workers in that sector.  Paradoxically, it
could be the case that although a sector-based union dominates an industry, the
collective agreement would be negotiated by a representative union at national level.
However, the law also allows for the presence of sector-representative unions (those
with 10% or more of the delegates in that sector) at the sector-level negotiation table.
Public administration workers also have similar rights to be represented (apart
from members of the armed forces, the police and judges) and they also vote for their
representatives in elections.  These rights are not regulated by the Workers Statute
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but by a different law hence elections were first held in the public sector in 1987.
Although there are slight differences in the number of representatives by workplace
size, and works councils operate under a different name compared to the private
sector (Juntas de Personal), the representation system is basically the same as that for
private sector workers.
ii. overall and relative union strength:  Table 5 summarises aggregate data on
worker representative elections held periodically in Spain since 1978.  The key
measure of union procedural strength is surely the proportion of such representatives
who are associated with a union, which has increased in every election.  In 1978, 70%
of representatives were union backed, with the rest unaffiliated.  By 1982 the ratio
had moved substantially in favour of unions - 88 to 12 - and by 1990 to almost
complete union control - 96.5 to 3.5.  Non-union representatives are few and far
between.  Whilst there are a number of possible reasons for the demise of the non-
union representative (with the concentration of union resources on elections probably
of most significance), it is rather curiously negatively correlated with the rise of non-
unionism among employees.  In fact the decline in non-union representation has been
even steeper and more prolonged than the decline in unionisation which reached a
floor around the mid-1980s.
The election data in Table 5 also describe the relative strength of each union.
The dominance of the two main unions is striking, and increasing throughout, such
that by the time of the 1990 election almost four-in-five representatives were affiliated
to either CCOO or UGT, up from just over half in 1979.  UGT has fared much better
than its rival over the elections, increasing its share of the vote every year and
surpassing CCOO for the first time in 1982.  Currently the gap is 5 percentage points.
Regarding the remaining unions, apart from the already mentioned regional
unions ELA-STV and CIG based in the Basque Country and Galicia respectively, no
other union achieves the category of "most representative" union within any
jurisdiction.  The social-democrat union USO, which was influential in the late 1970s,
has suffered from several divisions and some of its members joined the main unions.
At the moment, the number of representatives linked to USO is around 3% of the
total.  Remaining unions are small, most of them specialized in particular sectors, or
even firms (Escobar, 1993) without a national level structure.
There are some differences in the public sector, where a civil servants union -
CSIF,  obtained the highest number of representatives (25%) in the first public sector
elections held in 1987.  However, CCOO and UGT were also highly represented in
this sector, with 24.2% and 23.1% of representatives respectively.  The CSIF was
established partly because a majority of civil servants have centre-right political
affiliations which are not in conflict with the leftist ideologies of the CCOO and UGT.
Moreover the UGT was closely linked to the party in power (PSOE) and public sector
employees may be indisposed to vote for their employer's union.  However, the main
unions succeeded in gaining more ground in the 1990 elections which changed the
composition somewhat.  CCOO obtained the highest share of representatives (28.4%),
while UGT obtained 26.9%.  In contrast CSIF lost ground obtaining a share of only
19.4%.
Table 6 contains data on union representatives for each sector from the 1990
election.  Alongside data in Table 5 these show that the picture of union presence in
Spain is dominated by the UGT and CCOO in every sector.  There is a high number
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of small unions, sector or firm based, which may be playing some role in their
particular area, but they do not reach the representativity levels required by law to
participate in collective agreements at national levels, or in other institutions.
iii. why do unions operate within the worker representation system?:  Although we
have touched on this crucial question at various points above, it is worthwhile
considering just why it is that Spanish unions seem content to operate within the
boundaries of the worker representation system rather than try to build membership
through local organisation.  There are a number of explanatory factors here.  Firstly,
as already mentioned most union movements world-wide are constrained by legal
environments.  It would be very difficult legally for Spanish unions to change the
industrial relations system by unilateral action since workers have a right to
representation only through their elected representatives.  However, it would be
misleading to give the impression that the unions operate in this system because of
legal coercion alone.  Although the UGT makes noises about preferring a more direct
channel of communication with management through shop stewards at workplace
level - presumably elected just by UGT members - the CCOO is an open advocate of
the worker representative electoral system as it now stands.  Therefore another reason
why unions work within the system is because this is their policy decision.
Three other explanations for the status quo are:  the conditioning by custom
and practice clouds union leaders' perceptions of the cost and benefits of alternatives;
and a pragmatic recognition that abandoning the system might well bring about the
decimation of the union movement - since it would have to rely on the efforts of the
very small membership to maintain an alternative system; and the long-suspected
preference of union leaders for procedural rather than necessarily substantive power.
The impact of custom conditioning also helps to explain the previous distrust by
reluctance of works councils by British unions, which has disappeared over the last
few years in many unions to be replaced by conscious campaigns in favour of the EU
imposing compulsory works councils on British firms.  Therefore whilst some Spanish
unions may rue the day the worker representation system was inaugurated because
of its apparent impact on membership levels, British unions want to see such a
system introduced here in the belief that it might actually shore up membership.
iv. the CCOO/UGT duopoly:  The existence of this union duopoly and its effects on
the Spanish labour market outcomes has been extensively debated, especially by the
unions themselves.  There appear to be two main reasons for the duopoly - one a
result of the election system, and one a result of union objectives.
Any electoral system, political or otherwise, which sets a threshold of
representation status is likely to promote the existence of a small number of large
electoral organisations.  In addition, the provisions regarding the status of "most
representative" union for every organization organised into national confederations
(providing the proportion of representatives is surpassed) encourages the
amalgamation of small unions into larger ones.
Secondly, both the major unions were formed as class-based general unions
from the very beginning - ie they have no specific industry or regional roots.
Therefore it does not require a great change in objectives or character to absorb other
smaller unions or recruit previously unrecruited electors.  Moreover, their relatively
loose structures - with little attempt or ability to control the actions of local
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representatives or branches (discussed below) - makes it relatively easy to keep the
disparate groups within the same umbrella organisation. 
 Finally we should also consider why the duopoly has not become a monopoly.
Given the existence of union elections every four years, unions have to compete
among themselves to try to gain votes, since a higher number of votes imply more
representative share and more benefits.  That leads unions to differentiate their
campaigning programmes and does not favour either cooperation between them or
integration into a single organization.  Election periods are especially notable for
inter-union conflict.  In the last elections (1990) disputes over the timing of elections
reached court.   Both unions are said to be dissatisfied with this state of affairs, since3
they believe that the image of confrontation may have negative effects in terms of
membership and support.  However, there are also grounds for arguing that electoral
confrontation is likely to engender more worker interest rather than less.
v. workplace representation outside of the works council system:  There is scope
within the worker representation system for a second channel of worker
representation at firm level - union shop stewards (delegados sindicales).  Although the
worker representation system is mainly based in the existence of works councils,
unions are also allowed shop stewards at firms.  The most representative unions have
rights to participate in collective agreements (ie to substitute for works councils) to
provide information to workers and they can have an office at firms with more than
250 workers.  The minimum number of shop stewards stipulated by law is
determined by the size of the firm and ranges from 1 to 4 - with a minimum
threshold of 250 workers and a minimum of 4 shop stewards is guaranteed for firms
with more than 5,000 workers.  It is not clear the extent to which these minima are
exceeded in practice.
When shop stewards are not members of the works council they have the same
guarantees as those legally established for members of works councils and also have
access to the same information and documentation which an employer is obliged to
provide for works council members.  The shop stewards also have the right to attend
meetings of councils and other company committees including those on health and
safety.  They must be heard by the company prior to the adoption of collective
measures affecting workers or their members, particularly with respect to discipline
and dismissals.  The combined committee of shop stewards may also act as the
negotiating party for single-employer collective agreements.
It is a difficult task to measure the importance of these shop stewards in the
industrial relations system, given that there are no publicly available data on the
number of sections or shop stewards.  It is likely that shop stewards only play a
significant role in a small number of large firms.  Data from a survey of registered
collective agreements by García et al (1994) reveal that shop stewards negotiated in
place of works councils in only around 10% of firm-level agreements in both 1986
and 1992-3.  Given that firm-level agreements covered less than 15% of workers
during this period, shop steward bargaining is obviously a rare exception to the
general rule of works council negotiations.
vi. how strong are unions in Spain?:  The evidence presented on worker
representative elections suggests that unions in Spain are disproportionately powerful
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compared to their low levels of membership.  However, this rather presupposes that
the unions exercise some degree of control over their affiliated representatives.  A
UGT survey of its 1986 batch of representatives found that 40% of them were not
union members when elected.  Three years later less than half these delegates had
joined the union, with 23.8% of all representatives still not members of the union.
A majority of these expressed no reason for not joining, and only some of them
answered that they wished to be independent or that they had some disagreement
with the union.
This phenomenon may not apply to CCOO as well, but either way this does
raise an important question about the degree of control which the two large unions
have over their representatives, and also highlights possible inaccuracies in the data
on union/non-union representatives.  If a quarter of UGT representatives are not
actually members of the union, this rather changes the perspective of the data
reported in Table 5.  The implications of these non-union union representatives on
works councils must be worth further investigation through workplace or firm level
surveys.
c. Conclusions
Table 7 and Figure 2 summarise the available data on union strength detailing
the proportion of workers who are union members, the worker representative
electorate (proportion of workers in firms holding elections), the proportion of
workers actually voting in elections and the percentage of workers covered by
collective bargaining.  The most striking aspect of Figure 2 is the mirror image of
union density decline and collective bargaining coverage increase from the late 1970s.
Union potential strength should surely be measured as the proportion of workers
covered by bargaining involving union representatives, rather than by union
membership.  Although the latter provides a distorted picture of apparent union
weakness, the former may also overstate the importance of unions if those unions
exert little control over the actions of many of their delegates.
4. Union Organisation
Having assessed the changing strength of Spain's unions, another piece of the
picture concerns the internal organisation of the main unions.  The degree of control
exercised by the centre is likely to be strongly influenced by the structure of the
union and the communication mechanisms within the organisation.  Local branches
operating in a loose, federal organisation are more likely to enjoy autonomy than in
a centrally directed union.  We are also concerned with explaining why unions are
structured in certain ways and to what extent they are influenced by external factors.
In the UK, successive governments have attempted to interfere with internal union
affairs with the avowed intention of making unions more democratic.  There is partial
evidence that this has forced some unions to make significant changes to their
methods of operation.  However, given the lack of similar legislation in Spain -
interfering in the internal organisation of unions would smack of Francoism, such
that even if justified on an economic policy level, this would be politically unfeasible
The most striking aspect of union organisation in Spain is that the internal
structures of UGT and CCOO are almost identical.  Both unions are organised along
confederal lines.  They comprise a number of regional and sector based federations,
within each of which there are separate branches.  Most branches are members of
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both a regional and an industry federation.  UGT currently has 12 industry
federations while CCOO reports 20.  Both unions are aiming to simplify the industry
structure by mergers of similar activities, and give more power and resources to these
federations.  There are also some special federations within both unions:  white-collar
and professional workers; retired workers; and departments for women and youths.
The territorial structure follows the political-administrative structure of Spain.
Both unions have federations in each of the 17 autonomous communities, comprising
smaller territorial units (provinces and local federations).  The practice of maintaining
a double structure is justified by both unions as a way of giving unity to their
policies, considering not only the particular interests of workers in a sector, but their
collective interests as a class.  Apparently, this territorial structure plays a
complementary role in the unions' structure, since the most relevant internal tasks
(collecting members' fees, electoral strategies, etc) are attributed generally to the
productive structure.  However, some collective agreements are signed at regional
level, hence they are negotiated by the territorial federations. 
Each federation appears to have a high degree of autonomy over its activities
and operations.  The main stipulation is that they must have statutes which are not
in contradiction with the statutes of the union confederation.  Each federation must
comply with confederal agreements and general lines of policy designed by the
organization, but otherwise they are free to manage their own resources and to
implement their own policies.  The principal threat which the confederation can use
to keep a federation in check concerns their assets.  If a federation decides to secede
from the main union, its assets must be returned to the central organization.
In terms of confederal level institutions, both unions have surprisingly similar
structures.  The central decision-making body of UGT and CCOO is the Confederal
Congress, held every four years.   The tasks of the Congress are to determine the4
general tenor of union policies and to elect members of the confederation boards.
Delegates elected at sector and territorial level participate in the Congress, in
proportion to the importance of each group.  For example the UGT Congress consists
of 60% delegates from industry federations and 40% from regional federations, while
in the CCOO Congress the split is fifty-fifty.
When the Congress is not in session, the governing bodies of unions are their
Executive Commissions, formed by a General Secretary and a small number of
members, and another larger representative institution which meets regularly during
the periods between Congresses to supervise the actions of the Executive
Commission.  This body is called the Confederal Committee in UGT, with meetings
held twice a year, and the Confederal Council in CCOO meeting five times a year.
There are also other committees in both unions, to supervise the finances and to solve
internal conflicts (Commissions of Control of Finances, and Commissions of
Guarantees).
The similarity in organisation between the two main unions, and the fact that
the much smaller USO is organised along similar lines, suggests that these structures
may be heavily influenced by the industrial relations environment in which the
unions operate.  Their dual structure must be in large part because of the mix of
collective agreements at sector and regional level which are the prime focus of union
activities.  The increasing concentration on activities at sector level must be connected
with the breakdown of tripartite agreements at national level after 1986-7.  Clearly
union structures are self-determined, with no state interference.  
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5.  Union Finances
The health of union finances may play a large part in explaining their
influence, structure and policies.  Willman et al (1993) have recently conducted the
most comprehensive research project undertaken on British unions' finances,
constructing an "acid test" of union financial health in the process.  They define health
as assets minus liabilities divided by annual expenditure.  This measures how long
a union could survive without any income.  It has fallen from an average of over 4
to around 1.5 years in the postwar period.  Unfortunately, data on Spanish union
finances are rather inadequate for conducting this acid test. 
The main sources of revenue for unions are:  members' fees, which comprise
the largest single source; rents from assets and securities, which have increased
enormously since the advent of democracy as the state has gradually returned assets
(principally office buildings) seized under Franco; sale of publications and services
(the main unions offer members a range of services:  finance and fiscal advice,
advantageous insurance policies, house building cooperatives, and even travel
agencies); state subsidies (directly from a budget provision, split according with the
number of representatives obtained at elections); and indirectly, as payments for the
training courses organized by unions for INEM (National Employment Office).
Although there are no reliable data on total revenue, some estimates using the
number of members and the average subscription fee have been calculated.  Using
these data, the journal Economía y Finanzas reported an annual income in 1994 of
6,000m pesetas for UGT and 6,500m pesetas for CCOO.  Escobar (1993) reports an
income for UGT of 5,202m pesetas for the period January 1986 to January 1989, of
which 2,127m pesetas (41%) is attributed to state subsidies.  These estimates differ
widely, especially taking the different time periods into account, but without data on
actual union accounts, it is not possible to assess the validity of either.
The impression from unions' own literature is that their finances are quite
precarious bearing in mind the tasks they undertake - although they do receive
subsidies from the state in recognition that they represent all workers covered by
bargaining, even those who are not union members.  Nevertheless, unions claim that
there is no stable mechanism of union funding by the state - ie the funding is open
to political interference.  The law provides a mechanism of union funding from levies
on workers wages to alleviate the problem of free riders, by making non-unionists
pay a voluntary fee (canon sindical) to the agents who bargain agreements for them.
It seems, however, that this mechanism has never worked in practice, so the subsidies
from the state are probably still justified.
With respect to the internal organisation of finances, federations are required
to furnish the confederation with annual accounts.  In the case of UGT, industry
branches are responsible for the collection of fees, with the stipulation that they must
transfer 35% of this income to the confederation.  The regional federations receive
80% of this subscription income and the rest is used to finance the central institutions.
There is an internal Solidarity Fund, to which federations pay 9.3% of their income,
aimed to redistribute resources internally to help federations reduce their debts.
 The different federations of UGT determine the amount of union members'
fees, while the confederation only sets a minimum fee to cover the amount that
federations must transfer to them.  Federations are free to impose reductions or
additional charges on that minimum fee.  The objective is that members pay 1% of
their annual wage to the union.
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In the case of CCOO, it is less specified in their documents who is responsible
for the fees' collection and how their resources are spent.  CCOO seems to have more
problems of information and control over finances than UGT.  One of the objectives
of their last Congress in 1991 was to have a budget for the whole Confederation by
1993.  Their division of resources from fees is the following: branches - 60%;
territorial federations - 30%; confederal institutions, 10%.  The resources obtained by
other means than fees (subsidies, etc) are used in common by the confederation - ie
they are not managed directly by the federation which receives the funds, but by
confederal institutions.
Although there are some estimates of unions' financial health, and information
about how fees are collected and the proceeds distributed, in general we know very
little about union finances in Spain.  Given that their apparent paucity of resources
must be a major
constraint on their ability to function effectively, it is perhaps surprising that their
finances have not been investigated more thoroughly in the past.  However, it must
also be acknowledged that if they are relatively badly off financially, it is unlikely
that they will be willing to allow researchers open access to their financial records  -
let alone allowing the state to investigate their financial health.
6.  Inter-Union Relations
Unlike the UK, Spain has two peak organisations representing the interests of
labour, whereas the TUC fulfils this role here.  One of its main raisons d'etre is to help
settle inter-union disputes, principally over members, which has been traditionally
conducted through the so-called "Bridlington rules", after the seaside town where
they were drawn up.  There is no institution with specific remit to settle inter-union
disputes in Spain and therefore it is not possible to come up with a measure of the
extent of inter-union conflict.  Instead we have to rely on anecdotal information.
The two main unions have important ideological differences which certainly
led to conflict about dealings with government in the early 1980s.  When the PSOE
came to power in 1982, the strategies of the two were diametrically opposed.  While
UGT chose to cooperate with the government (after all they had common roots)
CCOO adopted a more critical position in refusing to be a party to any tripartite
agreement involving the government.  However, as the PSOE government's labour
market policies increasingly turned towards the promotion of flexibility and as
unemployment continued to rise, UGT became more critical of the government until
the two organisations broke their historic links in 1988.  The milestone was probably
the general strike in December of that year organised jointly by UGT and CCOO.
The weakening of the UGT's political links, plus the electoral frailty of the
communist party, PCE, has led to something of a rapprochement between the two
union confederations.  Cooperation seems to be the main strategy of the last few
years, though this is unlikely to ever lead to merger.  As well as the national level,
there seems to be little evidence of significant conflict at industry, regional or firm
level either.  For example, although the law does allow for multiple bargaining units
at industry level if the different groups of worker representatives feel unable to speak
with one voice, apparently single table bargaining is the overwhelming norm.
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Therefore the duopoly of the UGT and CCOO seems unlikely to be an important
extra element in determining the impact of unions in Spain.
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Part II
7.  What do Unions do in Spain?
a. Introduction
Having provided a picture of union presence, structures and strength and
having analysed the environmental factors contributing to these arrangements, the
crucial question of the impact of unions remains unanswered.  Freeman and Medoff
(1984) encapsulated this question as "What do unions do?"  Providing theoretical
justification and/or empirical evidence for either detrimental or beneficial effects on
performance, has dominated labour economists' debates on unions for at least a
decade.  A range of outcome variables have come under the microscope - wage
differentials, wage dispersion, job creation and job destruction, the pay/jobs trade off,
productivity, profits and both human and physical capital investment.  Of all these
outcomes, wages, employment and productivity have dominated the voluminous
literature.  Assessing the impact of unions on economic performance is an essential
element in understanding the influence of industrial relations institutions in general
in Spain, because only a relatively small proportion of employees work in non-union
environments.
Analysts of union effects have made use of a number of different indicators
of union presence and activity - including recognition, density, multiple unionism,
collective bargaining coverage and levels, number of shop stewards and incidence of
their committees - and have investigated associations using industry, firm and
workplace level data.  Without a doubt the most authoritative work in the UK has
been done at workplace level, principally using one or more of the three Workplace
Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS).  In the absence of publicly available data at
either firm or plant level in Spain which would be adequate to conduct proper
empirical tests of the impact of unions, a second best option (by rather a long way)
is to analyse industry level data.
In proceeding sections three measures of economic performance -
employment/pay flexibility, trends in wage dispersion and productivity growth - are
examined alongside three relatively crude union indicators - bargaining coverage,
bargaining levels and a worker representative presence measure.  The results
reported on the impact of unions on economic performance are rather tentative and
are subject to a series of caveats including the relatively small number of "matched
industries", the lack of control variables, the aggregated basis of the data and
concerns about endogeneity.  However, despite the caveats, the results provide a
basis for more thoroughgoing analyses of union effects using less aggregated industry
data and as an ultimate aim, establishment or enterprise level data.
b. Measures of union presence and activity
In the absence of both reliable and disaggregated union density data, three
alternative indicators are used:
i. the coverage of collective bargaining:  Defined as the proportion of employees in
employment reported to be affected by collective agreements at either single or multi-
employer level.  These data are reported every year by the Ministry of Labour, but
are somewhat unreliable in that in certain industries coverage appears to be greater
than 100% (on occasion three or four times in excess of this figure).  Such
discrepancies are not unusual with employer association or union reported figures
of collective bargaining coverage.  In the UK, official data on the number of workers
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affected by national agreements (published 1893-1978) regularly exceeded the number
employed in certain industries (Milner, 1994).  For the purposes of our empirical
analysis of unions in Spain, it is assumed in such circumstances that these industries
have complete bargaining coverage in the relevant years.
A further problem with using bargaining coverage data as a measure of union
presence is that although most worker representatives involved in the negotiation of
collective agreements at different levels do represent unions, a small minority are not
affiliated to any union (and as reported in Part I, some union representatives are
actually not even union members).  Secondly, although this measure does indicate the
degree to which unions play at least some role in determining the pay and conditions
of workers within an industry, they reveal nothing about the depth of union activity
in the industry - ie to what extent unions function at workplace or firm level.
Because of the aggregated nature of the data, they also tell us very little about
variation in union presence within the industry - some firms are likely to have higher
worker election turnouts than others - perhaps indicating greater local activity by
unions - yet the workers may still be covered by the same agreement.
Nevertheless, collective bargaining coverage data are used relatively frequently
in industry-level analyses of union effects (eg Denny and Nickell, 1992) and despite
the relatively blunt nature of this indicator it is still a sensible starting point for the
analysis of union effects on economic performance.  Note that we have conducted
some tests of pay/employment flexibility in Spain using bargaining coverage as a
control variable in an associated paper (Milner and Metcalf, 1994).
ii. bargaining levels:  Given the extent of collective bargaining coverage generally in
Spain, it is important to analyse variations in the impact of unions within this high
coverage environment by analysing the effects of different levels of collective
bargaining.  If Spain had its own version of WIRS, it would be possible to examine
the impact of unions on workplace performance in situations where single employer
bargaining dominates, compared to where multi-employer bargaining holds sway.
With Spanish industry data, however, we can merely indicate whether or not inter-
industry performance can be differentiated on the axiom of the degree of bargaining
decentralisation.  The variable used is the proportion of all employees in employment
in the industry (ie not just those covered by collective bargaining) who are covered
by a single employer agreement.  In theory, a relatively high degree of decentralised
bargaining might lead to unions acting in a more sectional way - accentuating
tendencies towards insiderism.
The bargaining levels indicator suffers from similar drawbacks as the coverage
measure (except that recorded single employer coverage is very rarely higher than
the number of reported employees in employment in the industry), plus some more
exclusive problems.  The official data do not record the extent of double-coverage, ie
the number of workers covered by both single and multi-employer agreements or the
relative importance of different levels within the double coverage sector.  The
questions required to root out data on such issues can only be applied in a workplace
or firm-level survey, and even then they are very difficult to both word properly and
analyse in a straightforward way.  One should also be aware of potential problems
of interpretation of empirical results because of the endogenous nature of the extent
of decentralised bargaining.  The decision to adopt single-employer bargaining may
well be conditioned by the economic performance of the firm or industry rather than
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vice versa.  However, given that bargaining structures have shown a degree of
stability and have so for around a decade, endogeneity problems are likely to be
relatively minor.
iii. worker representative presence:   Both the above indicators of union presence
and activity are relatively widely used in studies on unions or collective bargaining
in both single country and comparative studies, but are open to the obvious criticism
that they are as much a measure of the impact of management as they are of unions
since collective bargaining involves at least two parties.  A complementary indicator,
which is not commonly used, is the extent of worker representative presence which
is available for Spain in the form of worker election results by industry (unfortunately
only 1990 data are available).  The measure is defined as the number of elected
worker representatives per 1000 covered workers.  Ostensibly one might imagine that
there is little variation in such a measure since the state lays down certain rules about
the number of worker representatives which are mandatory for plants or firms of a
certain size (see Part I).  However, the 1990 election data reveal that in fact there is
huge variation in this measure from a low of 25.5 in construction to an enormous
274.2 in the production and primary transformation of metals industry.  The latter
number is absurdly high and is probably due to a large underestimate of the number
of workers covered by collective bargaining.  This reinforces the need to collect micro
level, validated data on the activity of unions.
The most important criticism of this indicator is that the variation in it may be
less explained by the extent of union organisation or activity, and much more so by
the composition of the industry in terms of plant and firm size.  Consider two
imaginary industries each with 10,000 workers.  In the unlikely event of one being
composed solely of plants with 50 employees and the other of plants with 1,000
employees, the respective indices of worker representative presence would be 100 and
21 respectively (if the second industry had only one plant, the index would fall to a
mere 3.9).  However, in the absence of data on plant size composition within
industries, it is difficult to directly measure the extent to which worker representative
presence is pre-determined irrespective of what unions may do in that industry.  As
such, this indicator is used with a healthy degree of scepticism about how good a
measure of local union activity and organisation it is and with a strong appreciation
of the need for less ambiguous measures.
c. Unions and pay/employment flexibility
i. overall results:  As discussed in an associated paper (Milner and Metcalf, 1994) a
key issue concerning flexibility in the industrial wage structure is whether or not the
correlations between wage and employment changes indicate that there is competitive
flexibility in the labour market.  The flexibility debate turns on the question of what
factors determine changes in labour allocation across industries.  In a competitive
flexibility environment, sector-specific shifts in labour demand will translate into
relative wage changes as well as employment changes in the short run with
expanding sectors increasing their wages to attract workers from other industries.
However, in the medium to long run such positive correlations will disappear as the
labour supply curve to the firm is more elastic in the long run than the short run.
An alternative point of view is that employers signal increased demand through job
vacancies rather than higher relative wages, such that there should be no strong
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association between relative changes in wages and employment either in the short or
long run.  The OECD has pitched its tent firmly in the latter camp, as empirical
investigation reveals that in most countries very few sectors exhibited signs that
sector-specific excess demand influenced real wage movements (OECD 1985a, 1985b).
Considering the whole sample of twenty Spanish industries first and to recap
our earlier findings, reported again in Table 8, there is no evidence of competitive
flexibility in the Spanish industrial wage structure over the period 1980-88 for which
we have adequate disaggregated data on wages, since none of the one year
correlations between changes in hourly wages and employment is statistically
significant and the majority are negatively signed.  In fact the only significant
coefficients are for the four and eight year periods, which have negative signs.  We
interpret these data as suggestive of an identification problem - ie rather than changes
in relative employment leading to changes in relative wages, instead changes in
wages caused by shifts in the labour supply curve to certain industries of a greater
magnitude and speed than shifts in the labour demand curve, may contribute to
differences in relative wage movements.  In other words positive employment
changes are large where positive pay changes are lower with causation running from
pay to jobs.  This interpretation is supported by the incidence of two important
changes in labour supply particularly from the mid-1980s - a rise in the labour force
participation rate of women (Milner et al, 1995:  Figure 3) and the massively increased
use of fixed-term employment contracts.  Both women workers and those on fixed-
term contracts are likely to be associated with relatively lower wages.
ii. high and low collective bargaining coverage:  Disaggregating the 20 matched
industries into those with high and those with low bargaining coverage provides a
relatively primitive way of determining the influence of unions on the relative
pay/employment relationship.  Analysis of such data conducted for an earlier paper
(not reported here) reveals that sectors with high coverage exhibited a more
significant negative association between employment and pay changes than those
with lower coverage, both over the 1984-1988 period and the longer 1980-88 period.
This rather suggests that unions act in a beneficial way where coverage is high, by
holding down wage growth in order to promote greater relative employment growth.
A priori this result seems rather against expectations that unionised firms and
industries are associated with higher pay increases and greater (smaller) employment
decline (growth) than non-union environments.  However, the comparison being
made here is not one of union versus non-union, but between different unionised
states of high coverage versus less high coverage.  An alternative interpretation of the
results in terms of what they mean for unions, is that encompassing unions (ie those
covering a relatively large proportion of employees in an industry) are likely to place
relatively more weight on employment rather than wages as an objective compared
to their less encompassing counterparts in other industries.  Low relative coverage
(which can still mean coverage of 40% or more) may lead to greater insiderism in
wage setting - a lower probability of employment enhancing wage setting behaviour.
iii. bargaining decentralisation:  A standard interpretation of the impact of
bargaining decentralisation is that a lower centre of gravity of bargaining leads to
better productivity performance but a worse pay/jobs trade off.  Industry or national
level agreements may prevent employers using productivity related settlements
which would be more feasible in a decentralised environment.  Again when relating
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this to the "what do unions do?" debate, this is really a consideration of what do
unions do in different bargaining environments rather than a pure union effect
question.
Correlation coefficients on changes in hourly pay and employment over 1 year,
4 year and 8 year periods are reported in Table 8, both for all 20 matched industries
and separately for sectors with high and low levels of bargaining decentralisation.
Ten industries have less than 20% of employees covered by employer bargaining
only, while the remainder have a higher proportion covered by such arrangements.
There is only one significant positive association between employment changes and
pay changes in the two series (for the high bargaining decentralisation sector)
suggesting little evidence of the competitive allocation of labour process in either of
the two sectors.  However, it is only in the low decentralisation sector that the
negative association between employment and pay changes in all sectors is replicated,
albeit with less significant coefficients.  This evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that sectors with higher levels of bargaining are more likely to exhibit
employment enhancing wage setting behaviour compared to those with a greater
degree of single employer bargaining.
iv. worker representative presence:  Potentially the best measure of union activity
is the worker representative presence (WRP) index - despite the various caveats about
what determines variations in presence - since it provides an indication of the degree
of union organisation at firm level within a sector.  A high level of WRP might
suggest a greater likelihood of wage drift from sector level agreements because there
are relatively more agents at local level to bargain with employers, who by weight
of numbers may be difficult to control or direct from the centre by union leaders.  A
higher degree of representative presence might be associated with poorer
performance on the pay/employment front.
It turns out that the correlation coefficient results on pay and employment
changes disaggregated by high and low WRP sectors, are very consistent with the
expected result (Table 9).  Sectors with less than 40 representatives per 1000 covered
employees exhibit a strong and significant negative coefficient for both the 4 year
periods (1980-84 and 1984-1988) and for the full eight year period examined.  By
contrast the sectors with relatively high levels of WRP provide a less consistent
picture in the medium and long run.  The one significant association is positive for
the period 1984-1988 - higher employment growth associated with relatively higher
growth in wages - whilst the coefficients for 1980-84 and 1980-88 are not significant.
Although only correlations, these data are at least suggestive of a relationship
between the extent of union activity at workplace level and poorer economic
performance.  Obviously a more persuasive analysis would require workplace or
plant based samples with better measures of union organisation and activity.
d. Unions and trends in pay dispersion
i. overall results:  Over the whole period 1980-1988 the Spanish hourly wage
structure became more egalitarian as the sectors with the highest initial pay, had
relatively the lowest subsequent increases, therefore the pay structure was
compressed.  In our earlier paper, it was pointed out that, by contrast with the UK
and US experience, the degree of pay compression was smaller in the first half of the
1980s - when incomes policies were in force - compared to the second half, when
income policies were initially relaxed and finally abandoned.  This degree of pay
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compression appeared to have beneficial knock-on effects on employment growth -
hardly unexpected given the negative association between wages and employment
growth over the medium and long run.  Sectors with relatively high initial wages
experienced the highest growth in employment apparently because of relatively
slower growth in wages compared to those with lower starting wages.  Unions are
generally associated with a narrower wage distribution than would result in a non-
unionised labour market - both external and internal.  This is partly because of
empirical evidence suggesting such an association but also because of unions'
tendency to organise relatively low paid workers (and by increasing their wages,
compress the overall wages structure) and espoused union policies such as "rate for
the job" and anti-performance- related pay.
ii. collective bargaining coverage:  Analysis of wage compression behaviour among
sectors with high or low coverage conducted in our previous paper showed that
whilst pay compression occurred in both high and low coverage sectors (all
coefficients are negative), the correlation coefficients were more impressive for the
high coverage sector.  This seems to be quite good evidence of the positive
association between unions and pay dispersion, assuming less dispersion is a
desirable outcome.  However, given the high coverage of unions overall in Spain, we
should also be interested in investigating variations in the impact of unions in
different environments - in this case in either decentralised or centralised bargaining
and in either high local activity and low local activity sectors.
Before discussing the results it should be noted that neither theoretical nor
empirical work in this area has investigated variation in union effects on wage
dispersion either in terms of union or collective bargaining structures.  Given other
factors associated with decentralised collective bargaining, we might well expect
unions to have greater wage dispersion reducing effects in centralised bargaining
environments - since the rate for job rather than performance related pay is more
likely to be associated with such an environment.  It is rather more difficult to make
predictions about any relationship between levels of WRP - our local union activity
measure - and changes in pay dispersion.  A high relative number of shop stewards
may indicate greater factionalism which could lead to greater dispersion as the
worker representatives act as representatives of relatively smaller constituencies.  On
the other hand, high WRP might indicate a greater ability of unions to impose a rate
for the job policy on employers and therefore reduce wage dispersion.  What is
obviously needed is an analysis of the explanation for different levels of WRP in each
industry or organisation.  Does a high WRP indicate more extensive union activity
in general or a higher degree of factionalism between work groups associated with
control difficulties for central union leaders?  Such an analysis is beyond the scope
of this study, requiring more micro based data and case studies, but it may well be
essential to understanding variations in the impact of unions in Spain.
iii. bargaining decentralisation:  The correlations on pay changes compared to initial
pay levels disaggregated by high and low decentralisation sectors provide some
striking results (Table 10).  In the ten sectors with low levels of decentralisation, for
the second half of the 1980s and the period as a whole there are strongly significant,
negative coefficients.  This indicates a clear tendency towards wage compression -
paradoxically even more so after the weakening of incomes policies (the coefficient
on 1980-84 is negative but non-significant).  In stark contrast, the correlations for the
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high decentralisation sector are all non-significant and one is slightly positive.  This
is as predicted - centralised bargaining is associated world-wide and over time with
a narrower pay distribution compared to decentralised bargaining.  The key question
is what this tells us about unions and pay dispersion.  If anything this suggests that
unions can have quite different effects dependent on their environment - there is no
monolithic "union effect".
The knock-on effects in terms of employment changes are more equivocal in
that although the coefficients for the low decentralisation sector are positive - as with
the aggregated data for all industries - only one (1980-88) is significant.  More
puzzling still are the results for the high decentralisation sectors where one coefficient
is strongly negative and significant (1984-88), whilst the others are positive, with
1980-84 strongly significant.  This change in slope, whilst just about consistent with
obverse changes in the signs on the pay changes/initial pay levels correlations, seems
rather odd.  For 1980 to 1984, the high initial pay sectors have the highest
employment growth, whilst the reverse is true for 1984 to 1988.  These results
illustrate the pitfalls of using industry level data to investigate the impact of an
institution which is best analysed using plant or firm level data.
iv. worker representative presence:  The wage compression and knock-on effects on
employment correlation coefficients are more difficult to interpret for the high and
low WRP sectors (Table 11).  There appears to be a consistent relationship between
low WRP and positive effects in terms of significant and strongly negative coefficients
on initial wages and subsequent wage growth (for two out of the three correlations)
and positive and significant initial wages/employment growth correlations (again two
out of three).  However, the results for high WRP industries look less consistent.  All
three of the initial wages/wage growth correlations are negative, with one
significantly so, but two of the initial wages/employment growth correlations are
negative, and one of these (1984-88) is significant.  These results suggest that in the
1984-88 period, in the high WRP sector, those industries with the highest initial wages
had the lowest subsequent wage growth, but also the lowest employment growth
compared to other sectors.  Whilst we should not be too surprised by such odd
results when using industry data over a short period without control variables, the
results also suggest that the WRP measure may be a poor measure of union strength
or local activity.
e. Unions and productivity
i. introduction:  There is a well worked-over debate within labour economics and
industrial relations about the effects of unions on productivity.  Theoretical debate
turns on the union monopoly effect (restricting productivity growth) versus the union
voice effect (improving productivity performance).  A range of mechanisms within
each of these effects link union presence and activity to efficiency - such as restrictive
practices, the closed shop and industrial action on the negative side and lower
turnover, less absenteeism and greater investment in human capital on the plus side.
As it is difficult to directly measure the role and impact of each of these mechanisms
to judge the usefulness of the different hypotheses, most empirical work in the area
has instead tested whether or not union presence and activity is associated with
better or worse productivity performance.
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For the UK there now seems to be a reasonably consistent story that on
average unions were associated with poorer productivity growth until the early 1980s
but that during the 1980s and 1990s growth had been more impressive in union than
non-union workplaces (possibly in two separate spurts in the early and late 1980s)
(Gregg et al, 1993).  Most commentators agree that the catch-up in productivity levels
between union and non-union plants is due to a combination of anti-union legislation,
increased product market competition and high unemployment.  In other words the
practices and attitudes which reinforced negative union effects have been reined back.
It is still an open question as to whether or not the voice effects of unions have now
or will in the future take over, such that productivity levels will surpass those in non-
union plants.
Turning to Spain, applying the theory is made more difficult because of certain
breaks on productivity which are not associated with unions per se - in particular the
labour ordinances and high firing costs for permanent workers.  To the extent to
which they are adhered to, the labour ordinances must act as a break on functional
flexibility within firms -which is surely a more effective means to increase
productivity rather than numerical flexibility in the form of fixed-term contracts.
Similarly the high cost of firing permanent workers means that high unemployment
is unlikely to have positive spin-offs on employed worker effort - there is insufficient
labour market induced fear for a large group of protected workers.  Given these
factors we might expect a marginal impact of unions on productivity performance -
perhaps by ensuring the strict enforcement of labour ordinances or making legal
resources available for permanent workers threatened with dismissal.
As with the employment and pay data, the absence of firm or plant level
surveys of industrial relations in Spain means that we are forced to fall back on
industry level data to investigate the relationship between unions and productivity
growth.  Again as it is difficult to isolate a pure union measure, we use the three
indicators employed above - bargaining coverage, levels and worker representative
presence. 
If unions do have detrimental effects on productivity growth in Spain we
might expect a negative correlation between union presence - measured as collective
bargaining coverage -and productivity growth across industries.  However, given the
high general level of union coverage, we should also investigate whether or not union
effects on productivity differ in alternative bargaining environments. 
There is a strong theme in industrial relations that centralised bargaining
environments, whilst often useful for improving the pay/jobs trade-off, are inimical
to productivity enhancing wage policies.  This is the criticism levelled at both the UK
experience of incomes policies in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the Australian Accord
in operation since 1983.  If such analyses hold up for Spain, when comparing the
degree of decentralisation with productivity growth, we would expect to see a
positive correlation over time.  Note that the latter result is more likely if
decentralisation of bargaining also means that the employer and worker
representatives can jointly agree to replace the industry's labour ordinances with
working practices of their own design.  One note of caution, however, is that
decentralised bargaining may not promote better productivity growth when incomes
policies are in force (until after 1986-7 in Spain's case) since the scope for productivity
enhancing pay settlements is curtailed.
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Finally on the WRP indicator, if this variable does measure the extent of local
union activity and organisation, then we might expect to find a negative correlation
between WRP and productivity growth. Much of the rationale behind the negative
union effect on productivity growth focuses on the influence of local representatives
blocking working practice reforms at workplace level and protecting demarcations
which contribute to relatively worse performance.
In all the results reported, productivity growth is measured as the change in
value added per head in each of 22 manufacturing industries between the years in
question.  Scatter plots and correlation coefficients are reported for three periods
against each union indicator -1981-86, 1986-91 and 1981-91.  Note that the results do
not include controls for the many other influential factors in determining differences
in productivity growth across industries, and are therefore very tentative.  They are
subject to similar caveats to previous results and as mere correlations should be
treated as the starting point for future analysis rather than hard and fast findings
about union effects.
ii. collective bargaining coverage and productivity growth:  The data reported in
Figure 3, with the correlation coefficients reported below, suggest that there is no
association between bargaining coverage (measured at 1986) and productivity growth
across industries in any of the three periods investigated.  The coefficients are not
even consistently signed, with two positive and one negative.
There are a number of possible interpretations of these results:  unions are not
associated with poorer (or superior) productivity performance perhaps because the
strength and degree of observation of labour ordinances and the role of permanent
worker protection override any general union effect; bargaining coverage is too
imprecise an indicator of union presence in an industry; the industry data are too
aggregated to reveal the more important impact of unions at workplace or firm level -
at industry level there are much larger forces at work determining productivity
growth such that even with better measures of unionisation any union effect may not
surface.  These interpretations can only be rejected or verified with micro level data.
iii. bargaining levels and productivity growth:  Figure 4 plots changes in
productivity against the degree of bargaining decentralisation in each industry (also
measured at 1986) for the two five year periods and for the 10 year period as a
whole.  The correlation coefficients are reported below the figure.  These data are
consistent with the general hypothesis that decentralised bargaining is associated with
superior productivity performance.  All three correlation coefficients are positive and
two are significant - 1981-86 and 1981-91.  On average the industries with the highest
proportion of employees covered by single-employer bargaining have the highest
growth in productivity.  The fact that the 1981-86 correlation is significant, while the
1986-91 correlation is not is rather curious since in the earlier period incomes policies
were in effect, whilst they were absent in the later period.  Perhaps incomes policies
norms were applied rather more flexibly in industries with high levels of
decentralisation and that the relaxation of incomes policies prompted more
productivity enhancing deals in multi-employer environments in the late 1980s.  This
is all worth considerably more investigation.
This result prompts a number of interesting questions which these data are
unable to answer:  what is the mechanism which links decentralised bargaining to
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superior productivity performance?  (alternatives include:  productivity based pay
settlements; evasion of labour ordinances; weaker union organisation at
firm/workplace than sector level; increased responsibility for plant performance
increases both management and employee effort); are there possible endogeneity
problems which mean that decentralisation would not produce such positive spin-offs
for all sectors?; are these results likely to be replicated in micro level studies of firm
and workplace performance? 
iv. workplace representative presence and productivity growth:  The final figure
(Figure 5) shows data on difference in WRP by industry (in 1990) and productivity
growth over the same three periods as previous graphs.  Although all three
correlation coefficients are negative as expected, none reach significance.  This may
well be due to the bluntness of the union indicator and the relatively small number
of observations.  A more accurate picture of the impact of local union activity and
organisation on labour productivity is only likely to be gleaned from a workplace-
or firm-level dataset.
8.  Conclusions, Policy Prescriptions and Further Research
Spanish unions enjoy a possibly uncomfortable mix of high coverage through
their dominance of representatives in the works council system, but very low
membership since the early 1980s.  Their strength measured on these two dimensions
looks alternatively either similar to union movements in many other OECD countries
or particularly sapped compared to other movements worldwide.  The worker
representation system has been cited as the main explanation for this high coverage,
low density nexus and the mirror image of coverage growth and density decline is
striking after the system was enshrined in the legal framework of the new democracy.
However, there is much to be explored here because other factors are also likely
affecting workers' decisions to on the one hand vote in ever larger numbers for union
representatives, yet on the other hand remain extremely reluctant to join those same
unions.
Information on union internal organisational structures reveals that these are
also quite heavily influenced by the collective bargaining system as determined by
the worker representation system.  Both the main unions, CCOO and UGT, which
together comprise around three-quarters of all union members and a similar
proportion of workplace representatives, are confederations comprising a number of
regional and industrial federations.  Each one of these federations incorporates a body
of branches which are usually members of both a regional and industrial federation.
The duopoly of the CCOO and UGT is propagated by the mechanism for selecting
which unions have "most representative union" status at different bargaining levels.
By virtue of their dominance nationally, both the major confederations have the right
to sit on every negotiating body apart from those just operating at firm-level. 
The importance of the worker representation system is further reiterated by the
fact that most unions appear to have concentrated their apparently fairly limited
resources on fighting the periodic elections, to the detriment of both recruitment and
encouraging the activities of shop stewards as a second channel of worker
representation within firms.  Although permissable under the law in large firms, the
latter seem to play on a very minor role in workplace industrial relations compared
to their works council colleagues.
28
The high coverage equals high union strength conclusion is tempered by a
number of important caveats.  Strength may be either procedural - being involved in
decision making processes - or substantive - materially affecting those decisions - and
in the Spanish case, high coverage may only represent the former type of strength.
This may be especially the case if unions exercise little control over the actions and
decisions of their representatives.  Given that a survey commissioned by one of the
two main unions found that nearly a quarter of their representatives were non-
members by choice (ie they did not join even after being elected), there are some
grounds for believing that control mechanisms are very loose.  Finally, substantive
strength implies that unions are having some effect on performance outcomes.  High
coverage, or indeed high membership, data are not in themselves proof that unions
have significant effects either positively or negatively on such outcomes.
In order to illuminate the crucial question "What do unions do in Spain?", we
make use of rather restricted industry data on bargaining coverage, bargaining levels
and worker representative presence, to investigate three sets of outcomes -
pay/employment flexibility, trends in pay dispersion and productivity growth.
Empirical evidence of this sort on the impact of unions using industry level data is
always rather unsatisfactory - especially when the number of matched industries is
quite small - since the scope for control variables is severely limited and the
important intra-industry differences are completely obscured.  Note also that because
no industry records particularly union presence, strictly we are not able to measure
a pure union effect - even if we had a panoply of control variables.  Instead we are
able to investigate what unions might be doing in different environments.  A pure
union effect would only be detectable with workplace or firm-level data, with a
reasonable proportion of unionised and non-unionised observations.  Nevertheless,
these results provide at least a starting point for a more thorough, micro level set of
studies of union effects which should aim to investigate these and other performance
indicators. 
On pay and employment flexibility, there is some support for the hypotheses
that higher bargaining coverage, multi-employer bargaining and relatively low levels
of union organisation and activity are associated with more desirable outcomes than
their counterparts.  Although the data show no evidence of competitive pay flexibility
in the Spanish industry wage structure, there is evidence that in some sectors relative
wage moderation is associated with superior relative employment change.  High
bargaining coverage and relatively centralised bargaining appear to be associated
with a narrowing of the pay distribution, with positive knock-on employment effects,
again consistent with some theories on the impact of collective bargaining and
unions.  However, there is no evidence that high levels of local union activity are
associated with either a narrowing or a widening of the pay distribution.  Finally,
there is a positive, significant correlation between the degree of bargaining
decentralisation and productivity growth across manufacturing industry over the
1980s.  This is consistent with both theory and evidence from other countries on the
impact of bargaining decentralisation.  Neither of the other two union indicators used
show any significant association with inter-industry productivity growth over this
period.
Future research on trade unions will be inevitably linked to that on works
councils since their recent fortunes, structures and futures are heavily intertwined.
Therefore any work on, say, the economic impact of trade unionism in Spanish firms,
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would probably need a dual focus on both what unions do and what works councils
do.  However, there are some specific union related issues worthy of further
investigation.
Accurately measuring union membership in Spain is notoriously difficult with
current data sources and yet may well be crucial to understanding the influence of
unions in different firms and industries, how and why they operate in certain ways
and the consequences for their finances.  It may well be worthwhile considering
adding a question concerning union membership to the labour force survey.  The
addition of such a question to the counterpart UK survey in the late 1980s, has
certainly contributed enormously to our understanding of both changes in union
density and more importantly its composition across different groups in the labour
force, industries and regions.  The discrepancies in individual level survey and union
reported data on membership are sufficiently large to warrant significant further
analysis.
Clearer illumination of the internal organisation of trade unions may provide
further insights into the fundamental question concerning what role unions play in
Spain - just how much control are union leaders able to exert over their
representatives at workplace, firm and sector level.  We should not be surprised to
find significant differences in the degree of control at each of these levels.  This
information, when patched into data on the structures of collective bargaining and
local union activity, may be invaluable in determining the impact of industrial
relations institutions in Spain.
Finally, the limited analysis of union economic effects needs significant
reassessment using more disaggregated data.  Researchers need to locate alternative
measures of unionisation and union activity, and both address other economic
outcome variables and, of course, include important control variables.  Such research
is only likely to be feasible once a WIRS or FIRS is completed in Spain.
It is likely to be politically unfeasible for current or future Spanish
governments to consider implementing laws which seek to internally reform trade
unions as successive Conservative governments in the UK have done.  However,
unions are likely to react to and be affected by changes in any or all of the above
institutions.  This is definitely the case with any reforms of the collective bargaining
system or the works council legislation, but also highly likely with the employment
protection and industrial dispute arenas.
The tentative results of our investigation of union effects using industry-level
data, might suggest that the government should both discourage further pay
bargaining decentralisation - if they are worried about pay/employment flexibility
and pay dispersion - and encourage it - if they are concerned about productivity
growth.  The negative association between high worker representative presence and
some indicators - although in substantial need of elucidation - might suggest a need
to reassess the statutory minima on the number of  worker representatives per firm.
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1. Throughout this paper we use the official data on collective bargaining
coverage.  However, a recent OECD report on collective bargaining coverage (OECD,
1994) using data supplied by Juan Jimeno, states that the official Spanish data
overestimate bargaining coverage, principally because of double counting, by up to
20 percentage points.  The Jimeno corrected figures are shown in Figure 1 and the
official data in Table 8 and Figure 2.
2. Membership was reported in Economía y Finanzas February 1994.  Density is
calculated using membership as the numerator and employed labour force (ie
including self-employed) as the denominator taken from Boletín de Estadísticas
Laborales, EPA-29, because employees in employment by region is not reported in
the Boletín.  Therefore union density measured in the conventional way (with
employees in employment as the denominator) would be higher, perhaps up to 20%.
3. Earlier this year there was some reform of the computation of election results,
which is likely to ease inter-union disputes over the timing of the elections.  Results
to determine representativeness will be computed continuously as elections take
place, instead of waiting until the end of the election period.
4. CCOO held its last Confederal Congress (its 5th) on December 1991, while
UGT's last Congress (its 36th) was held more recently in April 1994.
ENDNOTES
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APPENDIX
Data used in Tables 8 to 11 and Figures 3 to 5
1. Notes and sources
a. Employment Data
Employees in employment (asalariados) by industry
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social, Table EPA-16. 
Notes: 1. 33 classifications (matched to 20 pay classifications). Annual
1980-1991 (matched to 1980-88 pay data).
b. Pay Data
Average hourly pay by industry
Source: Encuesta de Salarios en la Industria y Servicios, Instituto Nacional de
Estadística.
Notes: 1. 23 classifications (matched to 20 employment classifications).
Annual 1980-1988.
c. Value added data
Value added by industry
Source: Anuario Estadístico (INE), Cap. IX, 2.1.7.
Notes: 1. 26 classifications (matched to 22 employment classifications).
Annual 1981-1991.
d. Collective Bargaining Data
Proportion of workers covered by any collective agreement by industry
Proportion of workers covered by employer bargaining only by industry
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad
Social. Tables Con-15 and Con-18.
Notes: 1. Employment and pay correlations:  33 classifications (matched to
33 employment and 20 pay classifications).  1984 data (mid-point
of pay data series) are used to identify industries with high or
low levels of bargaining decentralisation.
2. Productivity correlations:  33 classifications (matched to 33
employment and 22 value added classifications).  1986 data (mid-
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point of value added data series) are used to calculate the degree
of bargaining coverage and the extent of decentralised
bargaining.
3. In some instances the number of workers reported covered by
collective bargaining is in excess of the number of employees in
employment.  In such cases it is assumed that all workers are
covered.
e. Worker Representatives Data
Number of worker representatives per 1000 covered workers by industry (Worker
Representative Presence -WRP)
Source: Correspondence from Juan Jimeno, FEDEA.
Notes: 1. 64 classifications (matched to 33 employment and collective
bargaining, 20 pay and 22 value added classifications).  Data are
from the 1990 worker representatives election results.
2. In instances when more are reported covered than are employed,
it is assumed that 100% of employees in the industry are covered
when calculating the WRP figure.
2. Matched Industry Details
a. 1980-1988 Employment/Pay Correlations - 20 2-Digit Industries
Spanish English MLH
Extracción, preparación, aglomeración Coal extraction and manufacture of 11
de combustibles sólidos y coquerias solid fuels
Electricidad, gas y agua Electricity, gas and water supply 15
Extracción de minerales Extraction of minerals 21
Producción y primera transformación Production and primary 22
de metales transformation of metals
Industrias de productos minerales no Non-metallic minerals 24
metálicos
Industria química Chemical industry 25
Fabricación de productos metálicos y Metal products, mechanical 31-32
construcción de maquinaria y equipo equipment and machines
mecánico
Construcción de maquinaria y material Electrical machines and materials 33-35
eléctrico, construcción de máquinas de and electronic office machines and
oficina y material electrónico materials
Construcción de vehículos automóviles Cars and spare parts and naval 36-38
y sus piezas de repuesto; construcción and other transport materials
naval y otro material de transporte
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Industrias de productos alimenticios Food, drink and tobacco 41-42
bedidas y tabaco
Industria textil Textiles 43
Industrias del calzado, vestido y otras Footwear and clothing 45
confecciones textiles
Industrias de la madera, corcho y Timber, cork and wooden furniture 46
muebles de madera
Industrias del papel y fabricación Paper and paper products 47
artículos de papel. Artes gráficas y
edición
Industrias de transformación del Processing of rubber and plastic 48-49
caucho y materias plásticas y otras materials and other manufacturing
industrias manufactureras industries
Construcción Construction 50
Comercio al por mayor,intermediarios; Wholesale distribution,scrap and 61-65
comercio y recuperación de productos; waste metals, commission agents
y comercio al por menor and retail distribution
Restaurantes, cafés y hostelería Restaurants, cafes and hotels 66
Otros transportes terrestres Other inland transport 72
Instituciones financieras y seguros. Banking, finance, insurance, and 81-85
Inmobilarias. Servicios a las empresas. business services
Alquileres
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b. 1981-1991 Productivity Correlations - 22 2-Digit Industries
Spanish English MLH
Extracción, preparación, aglomeración Coal extraction and manufacture of 11
de combustibles sólidos y coquerías solid fuels
Extracción de petróleo y gas natural Extraction of mineral oil and 12
natural gas
Electricidad, gas y agua Electricity, gas and water supply 15
Extracción de minerales Extraction of minerals 21
Producción y primera transformación de Production and primary 22
metales transformation of metals
Industrias de productos minerales no Non-metallic mineral industry 24
metálicos
Industria química Chemicals 25
Fabricación de productos metálicos Metal products 31
Construcción de maquinaria y equipo Mechanical machinery and 32
mecánico equipment
Construcción de máquinas de oficina y Electronic office machines and 33,35
material electrónico materials
Construcción de maquinaria y material Electrical machines and materials 34
eléctrico
Construcción de vehículos automóviles Cars and spare parts 36
y sus piezas de repuesto
Construcción naval y otro material de Naval and other transport 37,38
transporte materials
Fabricación de instrumentos de Optical and similar precision 39
precisión óptica y similares instruments
Industrias de productos alimenticios, Food, drink and tobacco 41-42
bedidas y tabaco
Industria textil Textiles 43
Industria del cuero Leather and leather goods 44
Industrias del calzado, vestido y otras Footwear and clothing 45
confecciones textiles
Industrias de la madera corcho y Timber, cork and wooden furniture 46
muebles de madera
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Industrias del papel y fabricación Paper and paper products 47
artículos de papel. Artes gráficas y
edición
Industrias de transformación del caucho Rubber and plastic materials 48
y materias plasticas
Otras industrias manufactureras Other manufacturing industries 49
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TABLE 1
Union Density in Spain and Other OECD Countries 1970-1990
1970 1980 1990
 Australia 50.2 48.0 40.4
 Belgium 45.5 55.9 51.2
 France 22.3 17.5 9.8
 Germany 33.0 35.6 32.9
 Greece 35.8 36.7 34.1
 Ireland 53.1 57.0 49.7
 Italy 36.3 49.3 38.8
 Japan 35.1 31.1 25.4
 Netherlands 38.0 35.3 25.5
 New Zealand - 56.0 44.8
 Portugal 60.8 60.7 31.8
 Spain 27.4 25.0 11.0
 United Kingdom 44.8 50.4 39.1
 United States 23.2 22.3 15.6
Notes: 1. For some countries, data do not correspond exactly to 1970 or
1980.
2. In the case of Spain, the 1970 figure corresponds to 1977.
Source: OECD (1994), chapter 5.
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TABLE 2 
Membership and density of CCOO and UGT 1979-1991
Year (1)
Overall CCOO UGT Reported by UGT
Union (Fees' Payers)
Density
Membership
Members % Members % Members  %
(2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)
 1979   37.0  1,382,000 16.7  1,137,000 13.7      -   -
 1980   24.0    887,000 11.0    598,000  7.4   190,672  2.5
 1986   13.0    394,000  5.1    340,000  4.4   331,048  4.3
 1989   13.9    439,000  4.9    448,000  5.0   463,775  5.2
 1991   14.7    463,000  5.0    509,000  5.5   633,265  6.8
Notes: 1. Two different estimations of density for UGT are presented here
(columns 5 and 7).  Column 5 corresponds to estimated densities
from individual-level surveys (see sources) while column 7
shows densities reported by UGT.  See text for discussion of the
rather large discrepancies between the series. For CCOO the only
available information is from surveys (column 3).
2. Absolute number of members (in columns 2 and 4) are calculated
using total number of employees in employment.
3. The first density figure in column 7 corresponds to 1981.
Sources: 1. Densities:Columns 3,5:  FIES (1980) for 1979-1980; Taboadela
(1993) for 1986-1991.
Column 7:  UGT (1993).
2. Employees in employment (asalariados):  Encuesta Población Activa
(INE).
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TABLE 3
Composition of Union Membership by Sector
a. UGT density rates by sector
1981 1992
 (%)  (%)
Agriculture 2.1 6.8
Manufacturing 3.7 9.9
Construction 2.9 5.0
Services 1.6 7.6
Total 2.5 7.9
Source: UGT (1993).
b. Distribution of CCOO and UGT Membership by Sector
UGT CCOO
1981 1990 1981 1990
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Agriculture 6.3 2.3 4.3 3.2
Manufacturing 50.0 38.1 59.2 50.9
Construction 11.9 5.4 12.0 10.9
Services 31.8 54.2 24.5 35.0
100 100 100 100
Source: Taboadela (1993).
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TABLE 4
Statutory Number of Representatives at Firm Level
Workers Representatives (reps per 1,000 workers)
Worker Representative Presence
    6-30 1 55.5
   31-49 3 75
 50-100 5 66.7
101-250 9 51.3
251-500 13 34.6
501-750 17 27.2
751-1000 21 24
Notes: 1. In firms with more than 1,000 workers, the works council must
have 2 additional members for every 1,000 workers or fraction.
The maximum size of a works council is 75 members.
2. The worker representative presence has been computed choosing
the central point of each interval.
Source: Guía Laboral (1993).
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TABLE 5
Worker Representative Elections Results
(Number of Elected Representatives and Distribution between Unions)
1978 1980 1982 1986-87 1990
Total number 193,112 164,617 140,770 175,363 237,261
UGT 21.7% 29.3% 36.7% 39.6% 42.0%
CCOO 34.5% 30.9% 33.4% 33.8% 37.0%
UGT+CCOO 56.2% 60.2% 70.1% 73.4% 79.0%
Other unions 13.4% 13.4% 17.8% 19.4% 17.5%
Non-union reps 30.4% 26.4% 12.1% 7.2% 3.5%
Note: Data for 1986-87 and 1990 include public sector representatives. The first public
sector elections were held in 1987.
Source: Beneyto (1991).
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TABLE 6
Worker Representative Presence (WRP) by Sector 1990
Worker Representative Presence (WRP)
Sector er of Tota UGT CCO STV CIG r Union
Numb ELA- Othe Non-
Reps l O Unio memb
n
Agriculture,
forestry, fishing 4,998 12.8 6.0 4.9 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.2
Energy, water 5,444 56.4 23.7 19.0 1.1 0.5 10.2 1.8
Extraction
minerals, 20,394 61.1 22.2 20.0 7.9 0.4 7.1 3.2
chemicals
Metal products,
mechanic 23,645 48.5 20.4 21.7 0.4 0.7 3.1 2.1
equipment
Other
manufacturing 39,841 39.6 17.2 16.7 0.8 0.4 2.6 1.8
industries
Construction 19,476 25.5 12.1 10.9 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.4
Wholesale
distrib., 42,448 34.9 17.6 12.2 0.6 0.4 3.2 1.0
restaurants,
hotels
Transport,
communication 12,514 30.0 13.3 10.5 0.9 0.5 3.9 0.8
Banking,
insurance, 15,462 33.2 11.2 11.8 0.8 0.4 6.9 2.0
business
services
Public sector
and other 34,759 35.4 14.2 11.9 1.3 0.5 6.3 1.1
services
TOTAL 218,981 35.6 15.4 13.4 1.2 0.4 3.8 1.3
Note: Worker representative presence (WRP) has been computed as the number of
representatives per 1000 workers covered by collective agreements. The number of
covered workers was obtained from official data, correcting some sectors in the 2-
digit classification which presented a coverage above 100%. For those sectors, the
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total number of employees has been used. In the 1-digit classification of the table,
all sectors are affected by these corrections, apart from energy, construction,
transport and banking.
Sources: 1. Worker representatives elections results, 1990:  correspondence from
J.Jimeno.
2. Number of workers covered by collective bargaining by industry:
Boletín Estadísticas Laborales (Nov.1993), Table CON-15.
3. Employers in employment by industry:  Boletín Estadísticas Laborales
(Nov.1993), Table EPA-16.
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TABLE 7
Summary Data on Union Presence in Spain 1978-1990
 Year Employees Covered Electorate Voting Members
% % % % % Union
 1978 8,456.6 53.9  _ _ 37.0
 1980 8,032.5 76.3 41.9 _ 24.0
 1982 7,733.8 81.2 38.6 29.4 _
 1986 7653.9 82.0 54.3 43.3 13.0
 1990 9273.4 82.2 57.9 44.7 14.7
Note: The first and last figures for union density correspond to 1979 and 1991,
respectively.
Sources: 1.   Employees in employment:  Encuesta Población Activa (EPA).
2.   Coverage:  Boletín Estadísticas Laborales (Nov.1993), Table CON-1.
3.   Electorate, proportion voting:  García et al (1994).
4.   Union density:  Table 2.
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TABLE 8
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Employment using Data for 20 2-Digit
Industries - Disaggregated by Degree of Bargaining Decentralisation (BD)
Association Between Employment Changes and Pay Changes
Correlation Coefficients Hourly Pay
Years Overall Correlation 10 Industries with 10 Industries with High
Low BD BD
1981 0.0882 -0.0622 0.4038
1982 -0.1642 0.1490 -0.3637
1983 -0.0413 -0.4619 0.3279
1984 -0.0112 0.2611 -0.3801
1985 0.2059 0.3497 -0.1890
1986 -0.2339 -0.0394 -0.3274
1987 0.1128 -0.2484 0.5999***
1988 -0.3359 -0.3843 0.3718
1980-1984 -0.2963 -0.7659*** 0.1148
1984-1988 -0.4789*** -0.4741* 0.1430
1980-1988 -0.4775*** -0.5029* 0.2682
Notes and Sources:
1. BD = proportion of workers covered by single employer bargaining only.
High or low defined as above or below the median = 19.97.
2. See appendix.
3. Significance levels:  * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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TABLE 9
Correlations Coefficients on Hourly Pay and Employment using Data for 20 2-Digit
Industries - Disaggregated by High and Low Worker Representative Presence (WRP)
Association between Employment Changes and Pay Changes
Years Correlation Coefficients Hourly Pay
Overall 10 Industries with 10 Industries with
Correlation Low WRP High WRP
1981 0.0882 0.0763 -0.0472
1982 -0.1642 0.2642 -0.4438
1983 -0.0413 -0.6906*** 0.7713***
1984 -0.0112 -0.0534 0.1057
1985 0.2059 0.0745 -0.0098
1986 -0.2339 -0.1154 0.0377
1987 0.1128 -0.1114 0.0332
1988 -0.3359 -0.3816 0.3616
1980-1984 -0.2963 -0.8110*** -0.0419
1984-1988 -0.4789*** -0.5454*** 0.5592***
1980-1988 -0.4775*** -0.6846*** 0.2098
Notes and Sources:
1. WRP = number of worker representatives per 1000 covered workers.  High
or low defined as above or below the median = 40.47.
2. See appendix.
3. Significance levels *10%, **5%, ***1%
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TABLE 10
Correlation Coefficients of Original Level of Hourly Pay on Changes in Employment
and Pay 20 2-Digit Industries - Disaggregated by High and Low BD
Years Hourly Pay 10 Industries with 10 Industries with
Changes and Low BD High BD
Original Level - 20
Industries
1980-1984 -0.2292 -0.3430 -0.2399
1984-1988 -0.7712*** -0.8829*** 0.0136
1980-1988 -0.7710*** -0.9406*** -0.2025
Years Employment 10 Industries with 10 Industries with
Changes and Low BD High BD
Average Hourly
Pay Level -
20 Industries
1980-1984 0.4002* 0.3655 0.7827***
1984-1988 0.1508 0.4032 -0.6695***
1980-1988 0.4379** 0.5159* 0.4584
Notes and Sources:
1. See appendix.
2. Significance levels:  * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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TABLE 11
Correlation Coefficients of Original Level of Hourly Pay on Changes in Employment
and Pay 20 2-Digit Industries - Disaggregated by High and Low WRP
 Years Hourly Pay Changes 10 Industries with 10 Industries with
and Original Level - Low WRP High WRP
20 Industries
 1980- 1984 -0.2292 -0.3940 -0.1014
 1984-1988 -0.7712*** -0.8666*** -0.4927*
 1980-1988 -0.7710*** -0.9227*** -0.3069
 Years Employment Changes 10 Industries with 10 Industries with
and Average Hourly Low WRP High WRP
Pay Level - 20
Industries
 1980-1984 0.4002* 0.5627** 0.3507
 1984-1988 0.1508 0.3962 -0.7734***
 1980-1988 0.4379** 0.5863*** -0.1125
Notes and Sources:
1. See appendix.
2. Significance levels:  * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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FIGURE 3
Collective Bargaining Coverage and Changes in Labour Productivity in 22
Spanish Manufacturing Industries 1981-1991
Correlation Coefficients:
1981-1986= 0.1737
1986-1991=-0.1624
1981-1991= 0.0164
Notes and Sources: 1. See appendix.
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FIGURE 4
Collective Bargaining Level and Changes in Labour Productivity in 22 Spanish
Manufacturing Industries 1981-1991
Correlation Coefficients:
1981-1986= 0.4954***
1986-1991= 0.1107
1981-1991= 0.4050**
Notes and Sources:
1. See appendix.
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FIGURE 5
Worker Representative Presence and Changes in Labour Productivity in 22
Spanish Manufacturing Industries 1981-1991
Correlation Coefficients:
1981-1986=-0.0774
1986-1991=-0.1624
1981-1991=-0.1276
Notes and Sources:
1. See appendix.
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